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Faculty and Deans

Better Lucky Than Good
N eal D evins

in law schooL I
played a lot of poker. Through thousands of hours of observation, I concluded that some of my friends were blessed
with good luck and others cursed with bad
luck. For the fortunate, improbable odds did
not stand in their way of drawing the cards
needed for a winning hand. For the unfortunate, their drawing a good hand invariably
meant that someone else had drawn an even
better hand.
After teaching constitutional law for seventeen years, I have come to realize that the
"better lucky than good" adage is surprisingly relevant to Supreme Court lawyering.
Indeed, luck, not skilled advocacy, has played
a defining role in several landmark Supreme
Court decisions. Prominent examples include Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and,
more recently, Rehnquist Court decisions
upholding affirmative action and allowing
foreign nationals and enemy combatants
to challenge the war against terror. In the
pages that follow, I will explain how events
that unfolded after the granting of certiorari
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in all these cases played a pivotal role in the
Court's decision making. These events were
outside the control of the litigants and, as
such, fortuitously benefited one side at the
expense of the other side. In my review of
school desegregation and affirmative action,
I will make a second point, namely: interest
groups who make use of litigation strategies
that take many years to unfold will either
benefit or suffer from changes in popular
and elected government attitudes towards
their underlying cause. In the case of school
desegregation, the NAACP reaped the benefits of a multi-year litigation strategy; in the
case of affirmative action, however, changing social norms cut against the Center for
Individual Rights' systematic step-by-step
litigation strategy.
In advancing these propositions, I do
not mean to suggest that a well-thoughtout litigation strategy does not improve
one's chances of victory before the Court.
Relatedly, it is certainly true that advocates
sometimes undermine their cases by advancing arguments that neither the American
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people nor the Justices are ready to accept. 1 relations:'3 Public opinion matched these
My point, instead, is that out-of-Court de- Truman administration initiatives. In 1942,
velopments playa surprisingly large role in two-thirds of white adults supported public
shaping Court decision making.
school segregation. When Brown was decidLet me begin with the Brown decisions. ed, Americans supported the Court's ruling
Brown's declaration that "the doctrine of by a 54% to 41% margin. 4 Commenting on
separate but equal has no place" in public the impact of these dramatic changes in race
education is widely attributed to the NAACP'S
relations, Justice Felix Frankfurter remarked
"step-by-step assault on segregation in educa- that had the segregation cases been brought
tion, which began in the mid-1930'S with a in the mid-1940s, he would have sustained
series of cases against all-white professional segregation's constitutionality because "pubschools:'2 In these cases, the NAACP did not lic opinion had not then crystalized against
ask the courts to end racial segregation; in- ir:'5
stead, it argued that the state could remedy
The question remains: why do I say that
inequality by spending money on "unequal" the NAACP was lucky, not good? The fact
all-black schools. By chipping away at the
that race relations underwent a sea change
foundations of "separate but equal;' these
in the decades before Brown does not mean
cases were seen as necessary building blocks
that the NAACP was not monitoring these
to the Court's dismantling of segregation in developments. After all, · perceived public
public education.
hostility towards school desegregation figNo doubt, the NAACP'S litigation strategy ured prominently in the NAACP'S decision
was masterful. Its principal virtue, however, to pursue a step-by-step litigation strategy.
was that it took the NAACP twenty years to Moreover, by securing high profile victoask the Court to undo racial segregation in
ries in professional school cases, the NAACP
the public schools. During that time, there
educated both the public and the Court
was a basic rethinking of the propriety of ra- about the evils of segregation. For reasons
cial segregation by both the public and elect- I will now detail, however, I think that the
ed government. In the 1940S, FOR issued an NAACP'S victory in Brown was an accident of
executive order institutionalizing fair em- fortuitous timing.
ployment practices and Harry Truman deIn 1950, the Supreme Court decided
segregated the military. Also, the Truman ad- Sweatt v. Painter, a challenge to the all-white
ministration filed a powerful brief in Brown, University of Texas law school. By concludexpressing "concern about the effects of u.s. ing that intangible factors affect education,
race discrimination on Cold War foreign
including "reputation, ... traditions, and presI

Lou Fisher and 1, for example, have written about the causal connection between the Truman administration's claim that presidential war making power is unreviewable and the Court's repudiation of
Truman's efforts to seize the steel mills during the Korean War. See Neal Devins ~ Louis Fisher, lhe
Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 63 (2002). See also infra notes 33-40
(discussing Bush administration legal arguments in 2004 war on terror cases).
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Jack Greenberg, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 5 (1994), See also Richard Kluger, SIMPLE JUSTICE
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Mary Dudziak, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 27 (2000). See also Phillip A. Klinker with Rogers Smith,
THE UNSTEADY MARCH 217-21 (1999).
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Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 137 (1962).
Memorandum of William O . Douglas in Melvin 1. Urofsky. ed., THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS
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tige;'6 Sweatt convinced the NAACP that the
Needless to say, NAACP litigators did not
foresee
that the Vinson Court might not
Supreme Court was ready to rule against segregated public education. Correspondingly, be ready to validate their position (somethe NAACP decided that "no relief other than" thing foreseeable but outside their control).
"obtaining education on a nonsegregated ba- They also did not know that Brown would
sis" would be "acceptable" in future education be held over and that the accompanying decases. 7 At that time, however, there is good lay would result in Warren taking over as
reason to think that the Supreme Court was Chief Justice (something that was not just
not ready to strike down public school seg- uncontrollable but also unpredictable). The
reargument of Brown benefited the NAACP
regation.
When Brown was argued in 1952, Chief in another way. Not only did just-elected
Justice Fred Vinson supported school seg- President Dwight Eisenhower appoint
regation. Moreover, according to Justice Warren, he also backed the NAACP position
William O. Douglas's conference notes, the in the case. Notwithstanding his personal
Justices were set to vote 5-4 to uphold segre- opposition to school desegregation, he felt
gated education. s The NAACP, in other words, pressure not to repudiate Truman adminiswas overambitious in their timing. Rather tration claims about the social desirability of
than ask the Court to invalidate public desegregation.
One other thing: even if the NAACP'S exschool segregation in the immediate wake of
Sweatt, they should have waited for a further pertly crafted litigation strategy set the stage
coalescing of support for their position. But for Brown, what abour Brown II? The NAACP
this bit of bad lawyering (if you can call it suffered a stinging defeat in that decision.
that) proved irrelevant to the Court's ruling The Court flat out rejected its argument that
defendant school systems must be ordered to
in Brown. The reason: good luck.
take immediate action to desegregate or be
After hearing Brown, the Court held the
told a "day certain" for the complete desegcase over for reargument so that it could also
regation of their schools. Instead, the Court
decide the constitutionality of segregated
education in the "federal city;' Washington, concluded that "varied local school problems"
D.C. The following September, Vinson were best solved by lower court judges and
died; his replacement was Governor Earl "[sJchool authorities" and that delays associated with "problems related to administraWarren - an occurrence prompting Justice
tion" were to be expected. 11 By delegating
Felix Frankfurter to exclaim: "[TJhis is the
first solid piece of evidence I've ever had that the administration of school desegregation
there really is a God:'9 Warren, a skilled poli- remedies to school boards and district court
tician, patiently led a badly divided Court to judges, "the South was audibly relieved by
unanimity in Brown.!O
Brown II, a victory of sorts snatched from the
6

339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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Kluger, supra note 2 at 293.
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William O. Douglas. THE COU RT YEARS " 3 (1980).
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Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Righrs Litigarion, 1946-60:
An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 840 (1987).
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total defeat of only a year ago:' 12
ent, long-term litigation program:' 15 More to
The NAACP ought not to be faulted for los- the point, just as the NAACP sought an end
ing Brown II.Just as their victory in Brown was
to segregated public schools through a steplargely an accident of good timing, Brown II by-step litigation strategy, CIR also sought to
highlighted the Justices' disinclination to "find those institutions with programs that
get too far ahead of the political branches. discriminate based on race, target them, get a
Earl Warren. in particular. knew that the
victory, and parlay it into a larger strategy to
Eisenhower administration would not pres- challenge the entire consideration of race:' 16
sure southern states to implement ambitious Its initial target was the University of Texas
desegregation remedies. Eisenhower per- law school. Not only did Texas make use of
sonally intervened in the Brown II litigation, separate admissions pools for minority and
amending the government's brief to encour- nonminority applicants (making it "vulnerage the Court to take into account that the
able" to attack), Texas was also in the Fifth
segregated lifestyles of many people had been Circuit, where CIR thought that it had a betbased on more than fifty years of Supreme
ter chance of succeeding than in other federal
Court sanction. More strikingly, after invit- courts of appeals. 17
ing Warren to dinner at the White House,
CrR won that case, Hopwood v. Texas .
Eisenhower justified southern resistance to That 1996 decision, however, proved to be a
school desegregation this way: "These are not pyrrhic victory. Texas retrofitted its admisbad people. All they are concerned about is
sions scheme and, for a variety of reasons,
to see that their sweet little girls are not re- the Court denied certiorari. IS Seven years
quired to sit alongside some big overgrown later, the Court upheld the constitutionalNegroes:' 13
ity of race preferences at the University of
Fast forward forty years: The Center for Michigan law school in another CIR case,
Individual Rights (CIR), a conservative pub- Grutter v. Bollinger.
lic interest law firm, sought to undo affirWhen CIR filed Grutter (and a companion
mative action by '(luplicat[ingJ" the success
case, Gratz v. Bollinger) in 1998, it had reason
and techniques of "liberal groups such as
to be optimistic. In addition to Hopwood, CIR
the ACLu" and NAACP. 14 In particular, CIR en- had just scored an important victory in litigadeavored to '(levelop and implement a coher- tion challenging Proposition 209, California's
12

]. Harvie Wilkinson III. FROM BROWN TO BAKKE : THE SUPREME COURT: SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
1954-1978 at 64 (1979).

13

Earl Warren. THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 291 (1977).
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A Brief History of CIR. available at www.cir-usa.org/history.html.
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Charles]. Ogletree. Jr.• From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 How. L.J. 499. 533 (2004).
Hardly a fan of CIR'S agenda. Ogletree depicted CIR'S strategy as "frighteningly similar" to the NAACP'S
building block approach. Id.
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David Segal. Putting Affirmative Action on Trial. WASH. POST. Feb. 20, 1998. See also Michael S. Greve.
The Demise of Race-Based Admissions Policies. CHRON. OF HIGHER ED .• March 19. 1999 (CIR cofounder describing Hopwood litigation as "an opening salvo" in a "larger strategy").
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By 1996.Justices Kennedy and O'Connor regularly avoided ruling on cases raising divisive social issues. See
Thomas W. Merrill. The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis. 47 ST. LOUI S U.
L.]. 569 (2003). Furthermore. as suggested in a concurrence to the Court's cert denial. a decision assessing
the legality of an affirmative action plan no longer in effect would open the Court up to charges ofjudicial
overreaching. Texas v. Hopwood. 518 U.S . 1033 (1996) (concurring opinion ofJustices Ginsburgand Souter).
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anti-affirmative action ballot initiative. And
while the Supreme Court refused to hear
Hopwood, the Justices had ruled in [995 that
race preferences are subject to strict scrutiny
review.19 Moreover, Michigan seemed a vulnerable target. Michigan lawmakers opposed
to affirm ative action had identified about 100
potential plaintiffs, including Barbara Grutter (a moth er of two with high LSAT scores
who owned her own health care consulting
firm ) and Jennifer Gratz (a "camera ready"
homecoming quee n from a blue-collar family with stellar grades and no apparent politicalleanings).2o Also, Michigan made use
of race-specific grids and charts when implementing its undergraduate affirmative action
scheme.21
By the time th e Supreme Court issued
its ruling in Crutter, however, affirmative
action seemed to have become entrenched.
N ot onl y did the traditional allies of preferences continue to support affirmative action,
Republican lawmakers backed away from effort s to undo race preferen ces. Republicans
in the House and Senate, for example, voted
down proposals to roll back federal affirmative-action programs. Recognizing that
the GOP would need to attract the growing
number of working women and Hispanic
voters, Republican leadership thought it better "to craft a positive message for minorities"
19
20
21

Adarand v. Pena,
Segal, supra note

than risk harming itself at the polls.22 At the
state leveL moreover, Republican lawmakers perceived that their party was harmed
by anti-preference ballot initiatives. By 2000,
the populist revolt against affirmative action
largely had fizzled in response to Republican
party pressure.23
From CIR'S perspective, the timing of the
Crutter litigation was anything but optimal.
With ever-diminishing elected official and
interest group opposition to preferences, crR
thought it had only one important ally, the
Bush White House. 24 That ally, however,
wound up distancing itself from crR. Indeed,
for reasons I will now detaiL the biggest
boost for affirmative action may well have
come from George W. Bush.
One day before his Justice Department
filed a brief in the Michigan cases, the
President announced that he "strongly
support[ s] diversity ... including racial di versity in higher education" but that the
Michigan plans were at "their core" an unconstitutional "quota system:'25 Consistent with
these remarks, the Justice Department brief
suggested that universities may make use of
race preferences when race-neutral alternatives are ineffective. In other words, unlike
the Reagan and first Bush administrations
(where the government argued that any consideration of race was impermissible), the

515 U.S. 200 (1995).
17; Jon athan Groner, Center Ring, L EGAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, National at r.

The C ourt seized upon this fact in Gra tz , striking down the undergraduate scheme because it awarded
a set nu mber of poi nts [0 all minori ty appli cants. 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2428-30 (2003). For reasons I have
deta il ed elsewhere, Gra lz (when read [Ogether with Grutter ) places few limits on universities th at want
[0 empl oy t'lce preferences. See Nea l D evins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 1
52 U. PA. 1. RE V. 347,

376- 81(2003) .
22

Julier Eilperin, House D efeats Bill Targeting C ollege Affirmative Action, WASH. POST, May 7, 1998 at
A4·

23

See Alex Fryer, Affirmative Action Fight S hifts from Ballot Box

25, 2002 at

A
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With John Ashcroft (who opposed preferences in rhe U.S . Senate) serving as Attorney General an d
Ted O lso n (who wo rked with CIR in the Hop wood litigation ) serving as Solicitor General, CIR had good
reason [0 t hi nk it could count on strong Ju stice D epartment backing.

25

Remarks on the Michiga n Affirmat ive Actio n C ase, 39 WEEKLY COMPoPRES. Doc. 71(Jan . 15, 2003).
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George W. Bush Justice Department sought
to steer a middle path on preferences.
By telling the Court that a "conservative
president does not think that he can afford
to stand unambiguously for colorblindness;'26 Bush made clear how politically isolated opponents of preferences had become.
In so doing. Bush made it that much harder
for the Justices - especially swing-Justices
who typically pay close attention to social
and political forces - to validate CIR'S position. Moreover, even if the Court's swing
Justices were predisposed to validating affirmative action, the Bush brief may have
contributed to the Court's lopsided and
sweeping approval of preferences. 27 Equally
significant, it is extremely unlikely that another administration will seek the overturning of Grutter (through judicial filings or
Court appointments). Just as the Truman
brief in Brown operated as a constraint on
subsequent administrations, the Bush brief
in Grutter signals executive approval of race
diversity.
From CIR'S vantage, bad luck explains the
Bush administrations rejection of their position. The Bush brief was a direct response
to racially insensitive remarks made by thenSenate majority leader Trent Lott - remarks
made about a month before the Bush brief
was due to the Supreme Court. In December

Senator Lott appeared to embrace the
segregationist appeals of Strom Thurmond's
1948 presidential campaign. The President
immediately denounced the Senator. More
significantly, responding to political advisors
who told him that he must do better with
minority voters, the President looked for
ways to convince voters that his denouncement was sincere. His qualified embrace of
affirmative action was the most visible way
that the President distanced himself from
the Lott imbroglio. 28
Grutter and Gratz, like the Brown opinions
before them, underscore the pivotal role that
luck plays in Supreme Court decisionmaking. Just as the NAACP could not foresee Earl
Warren becoming Chief Justice after the first
round of oral arguments in Brown, CIR could
not anticipate Trent Lott's remarks or the
impact of those remarks on the Bush White
House. Likewise, just as the NAACP litigation
strategy allowed social and political forces to
catch up to its arguments against segregation,
CIR'S step-by-step litigation strategy had the
unintended consequence of allowing majoritarian forces to coalesce in support of affirmative action. 29
What is amazing here is that Grutter
and Brown are anything but anomalous.
Advocates often find themselves sabotaged (as did CIR) or propelled forward
2002,

26

Negative Reaction, NAT·L. REv., Feb. 10, 2003 at 12.

27

In Crutter. six Justices explicitly approved of preferences. one expressed no opinion on the issue, and
two explicitly rejected preferences. For a discussion of why I think the decision gives college and university officials near carte blanche power to administer preferential treatment programs. see Devins. supra
note 21 at 376-8I.
For news stories detailing the Lott episode and its impact on the Bush brief, see Adam Nagourney.
With His Eyes on Two Political Pri:z:es, the President Picks His Words Carefully, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2003 at A26; June Kronhol:z: .tiJ Jeanne Cummings. Bush Decries Racial Preferences. WALL ST. J.. Jan. 16.
2003 at A4.
Before the Supreme Court. these majoritarian forces were on display. No member of Congress submitted a brief supporting CIR'S position. In sharp relief, briefs were filed in support of affirmative action by
124 members of Congress. Likewise. 23 states backed the University of Michigan (with only one state,
Florida. opposing race preferences). Finally, big business, unions. civil rights interests. and colleges and
universities overwhelmingly backed the Michigan plans. See Devins. supra at 366-70. See also Carter
G. Phillips, Was Affirmative Action Saved by its Friendsr. in Neal Devins .tiJ Davison M. Douglas eds.,
A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 115-29 (2004).
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(as did the NAACP) by unexpected events
that take place after the Court grants certiorari. Consider, for example, Roe v. Wade
and 2004 Supreme Court decisions limiting presidential warmaking authority. Like
Brown, Roe was a case where a change in
the Court's personnel resulted in reargument and, ultimately, a different rationale.
When Roe was first argued (in December
1971), there were two vacancies on the
Court - seats ultimately filled by William
Rehnquist and Lewis Powell. At that time,
a 5-2 majority found the Texas abortion
statute unconstitutional. The case was assigned to Harry Blackmun, the most tentative of the majority Justices. A cover note
to his draft opinion suggested that he was
"flexible as to results;" Blackmun's draft opinion, moreover, invalidated the Texas law on
narrow "void for vagueness" grounds. 3D
Other Justices in the Roe majority would
have preferred a more forceful opinion but
did not want to run the risk of reargument
(fearing that Blackmun would switch sides
and that Powell and Rehnquist would join
this group to form a five-member majority
rejecting abortion rights). This effort failed,
for Chief Justice Warren Burger strongly
backed reargument - an event that prompted William O. Douglas to write a memo
to the Justices complaining of Burger's
"manipulat[ion):' For Douglas: "The plea that
the cases be reargued is merely strategy by a
minority somehow to suppress the majority
view with the hope that exigencies of time
will change the result:'31 Contrary to Burger's
30

31
32

apparent intent, changes in the internal dynamics of the Court transformed Blackmun's
mealy mouthed Roe draft into an absolutist
pro-choice decision. In particular, Powell's
prodding of Blackmun resulted in the Court's
embrace of the highly controversial and nowdefunct trimester standard.
No doubt, Burger and Douglas's battle
over reargument in Roe did not anticipate
Powell's role in the decision. For their part,
pro-choice advocates in Roe could not foresee the Court's reargument let alone the
proclivities of Justices who had not been
confirmed when the case was first argued.
Indeed, when the Court granted certiorari
in Roe, Hugo Black and John Harlan seemed
certain to participate in the case. For all these
reasons, Roe's reasoning and landmark status
are certainly tied to events outside the advocates' controp2
Events subsequent to the granting of certiorari and outside the advocates' control also
figured prominently in this past term's war
on terror decisions. Shortly after April 2004
oral arguments, the world learned about the
prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq. The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison highlighted
the potential for abuse when the executive
branch has unchecked authority over detainees. More to the point, the prison scandal cast doubt on the very arguments made
by Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement.
Clement told the Justices that it's "the judgment of [military officials] involved in this
process that the last thing you want to do
is torture somebody or try to do something

David J. Garrow, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 547-48 (1994) (quoting Blackmun memo). Blackmun's
draft opinion in the related Georgia case, Doe v. Bolton, more forcefully overturned Georgia's abortion
statute. Id. at 549-51. That draft opinion, however, did not go as far as other Justices in the majority
would have liked and did not come close to embracing the trimester standard that the Court ultimately
adopted in Roe. Id. at 551.
Id. at 555 (quoting Douglas memo).
It should also be noted that the Roe litigation was anything but well thought out. Rather than a
carefully drawn out plan from a national interest group, Roe was a grass roots, seat of the pants effort. See Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. 1. REV. 1433, 1444-45 (1995).
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along those lines:'33 Yet torture was clearly a rebuke of administration claims that "where
fixture at Abu Ghraib. Further harming the
the government is on a war footing. you have
to
trust the executive:'37 Traditionally, the
administration's case, Justice Department
memoranda that provided a legal justifica- Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to
second-guess the decisions of elected offition for the torturing of al Qaeda terrorists
cials in time of war. 38 Before the Abu Ghraib
were disclosed by The Washington Post, New
York Times, and other media outlets in May scandal, that tradition might have prompted
and June 2004. 34 And if that was not enough, judicial deference to executive and military
administration officials acknowledged in judgments. 39 And even if the Court would
the midst of this imbroglio that interroga- have ruled against the administration, the
tion experts from the American detention prison scandal and related developments
camp at Guantanamo Bay trained military may have prompted the Court's rebuke of
intelligence teams at Abu Ghraib (and that administration efforts "to condense power:'40
In critical respects, the administration
training included techniques utilized at
Guantanamo).35
made its bad luck in the war on terror cases.
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder That is not to say that the prison scandal did
that the Court concluded both that "a state
not come as a surprise to administration ofof war is not a blank check for the president" ficials. Justice Department attorneys defendand that "essential constitutional promises ing the administration before the Supreme
may not be eroded:'36 Two months earlier, Court, in particular, were almost certainly
unaware of Abu Ghraib (and, quite possibly,
when the Court heard oral arguments in these
cases, there was little reason to expect such a the torture memos). Otherwise, they would
33
34

35

36
37
38
39

40

40

Respondent's statement during oral argument at so, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, available at
supreme.lp.lindlaw.com/ supreme_court/ docket/ 2003/ april.html.
Dana Priest ~ R.Jeffrey Smith, Memo Offered Justilication for Use of Torture. WASH. POST, June 8,
2004 at AI; Neil A. Lewis, Justice Memo Explained How to Skip Prisoner Rights, N.Y. Times, May 21,
2004 at AS.
See Douglas Jehl ~ Andrea Elliot, Cuba Base Sent Its Interrogators to Iraqi Prison, WASH. POST, May
28, 2004 at AS; Dana Priest ~ Bradley Graham, Guantanamo List Details Approved Interrogation
Methods, WASH. POST, June 10, 2004 at AI3.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
Petitioner's statement during oral argument at 23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, No. 03-1027, available at supreme.lp.lindlaw.com/ supreme_court/ docket/ 2003/ april.html.
Along with Lou Fisher, I have detailed the Court's growing reluctance to interfere with unilateral presidential war making. See Devins ~ Fisher, supra note I.
Absolutist arguments by the Bush administration in the war on terror cases might well have been
tied to increasing judicial deference towards presidential war making. Following the prison scandal.
however, the administration understood that social forces weighed against its arguments. In an effort to counter these forces, the administration sought to call attention to the risks of a Court ruling limiting presidential power. On June I, Deputy Attorney General James Corney spoke of administration efforts to play to the "court of public opinion" by releasing documents suggesting that
enemy combatant Jose Padilla planned to detonate a radiological dirt bomb and to blow up apartment buildings. Scott Turow, Trial by News Conference? No Justice in That, WASH. POST, June 13,
2004 at BI (quoting Corney). For his part, President Bush sought to limit the damage of the Justice
Department terror memo. On June 17, the White House released a 2002 presidential memorandum
in which Bush "decline(d] to exercise" the powers that the Justice memo said he had, preferring instead to abide by"the provisions of(the] Geneva (Conventions]:' "Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and
Taliban Detainees;' memorandum of February 7, 2002 from President Bush to the Vice President et al.
Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (emphasis in original).
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never have said what they did during oral argument. For this very reason, the war on terror cases are cut from the same cloth as the
other cases discussed in this essay. Events outside of the litigants' control - many of which
happened after oral argument - shaped the
social context and almost certainly the content of the Court's decisions.
More than eighty years ago, Justice
Cardozo reminded us that the 'great tides
and currents which engulf the rest of men
do not turn aside in their course and pass
the judges by:'41 Skilled litigants can ride the
crests of these tides and, in this way, help
shape Court decisionmaking. Nevertheless,
as both Grutter and Brown show, majoritarian pressures ebb and flow - so that it is very

41

Benjamin

N.

Cardozo, THE NATURE

rr fj a n
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hard to predict precisely when a multi-year
litigation strategy should commence and
precisely when litigants should go for the
jugular by seeking Supreme Court review of
the issue that matters most to them. Beyond
majoritarian pressures, luck sometimes
plays a prominent - perhaps decisive - role
in Court decisionmaking. Indeed, after the
Court grants certiorari (and sometimes after
oral argument), the reasoning and outcome
of Court decisions often seem to be a byproduct of events that no litigant can predict
nor control. Grutter, Brown, Roe, and the war
on terror cases are all examples of this phenomenon. In all of these cases, the winning
litigant can attest to the fact that being lucky
is often better than being good.
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OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
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